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INTRODUCTION: THE ANTARCTICA TREATY SYSTEM AND CURRENT
ISSUES

The purpose of this article is to analyze the decision-making
system set forth in the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctica
Mineral Resources' (the "Convention"), and certain related issues,
in order to contribute to the evaluation of the Convention, particularly from the perspective of the United States. Any complete evaluation of the Convention must include an analysis of factors external to the Convention itself, the objectives the Convention
purports to achieve, the reasons behind its negotiation at this time,
and any alternatives to the Convention.
Since the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty (the "Treaty") in
1959,2 relations between states regarding Antarctica have been relatively tranquil. 3 States have maintained this tranquility despite
the existence of fundamental legal and political differences regarding the status of Antarctica and the rights of states and private
1. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for
signature Nov. 25, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 [hereinafter Convention].
2. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
3. See Negroponte, The Success of the Antarctic Treaty, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1987, at
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parties to use and regulate this area."
When entering into any discussion of the Antarctic Treaty system, one must bear in mind three basic political facts about Antarctica. First, seven foreign states have made territorial claims
that, taken together, cover most of Antarctica; some of these
claims overlap. 5 Second, the United States, the Soviet Union, and
other non-claimants do not recognize these claims, and assert a
right, subject to their treaty obligations, -for themselves and their
nationals to conduct activities anywhere in Antarctica without the
consent or control of a foreign government.' Finally, the United
States and the Soviet Union believe that they each have a basis for
making a claim over Antarctica.'
These facts give rise to three potential sources of conflict: disputes between existing or future territorial claimants with overlapping claims; disputes between territorial claimants and states that
do not recognize the claims; and disputes between rival powers for
strategic superiority in Antarctica.
The Antarctic Treaty attempts to minimize existing sources of
conflict, avoid new sources of conflict, and provide a framework for
cooperation in the common interest of states. The treaty achieves
these objectives by essentially demilitarizing Antarctica, 8 opening
all Antarctic areas and stations to inspection," providing for freedom of scientific research, 0 prohibiting new territorial claims or
enlargements of existing claims," and establishing a system for
consultation and regulation of activities by concerned states for
scientific, environmental, and other purposes.' The Treaty does
not, however, resolve the underlying differences regarding territo4. For general discussions of these differences, see Bilder, The Present Legal and Political Situation in Antarctica, in THE NEw NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES (J.
Charney ed. 1982); The International Legal Regime for Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
155 (1986).
5. See G. TRIGGS, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME 51 (1987).

Argentina, Australia,

Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom are the states laying claim to
parts of Antarctica. The claims of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom overlap. Part
of Antarctica is unclaimed. For a discussion of these competing claims, see also Burton, New
Stresses on the Antarctic Treaty: Toward International Legal Institutions Governing
Antarctic Resources, 65 VA L. REV. 421, 458-72 (1979).
6. G. TRIGGS, supra note 5, at 53.
7. Id.
8. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. I.
9. Id. art. VII.
10. Id. art. II.
11. Id. art. IV(2).
12. Id. art. IX.
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rial claims, but rather sidesteps the problem.
Apart from inspection for purposes of verifying compliance, 3
perhaps the only use of Antarctica expressly permitted by the
Treaty is scientific research.' Any time a state contemplates a use
not provided for in the Treaty, it raises a question of the power to
authorize and regulate that use. This question, in turn, re-opens
the underlying problem posed by the territorial claims: claimants
assert the right to control all activities in the claimed areas (except
as otherwise agreed), while states that do not recognize the claims
assert a right for themselves and their nationals to conduct any
activity in Antarctica without foreign interference (except as otherwise agreed).
This problem arose some years ago in connection with fishing
off Antarctica. Increased interest in commercial exploitation of
Antarctic marine living resources 5 and recognition of the right of a
state to regulate fishing within 200 miles of its land territory' created a need to agree on a system of regulation not only for conservation purposes but also to avoid a dispute over the territorial
claims that could threaten the stability of the Antarctic Treaty
system. By bringing together the territorial claimants and the
states interested in fishing and conservation in a single regulatory
system, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources, 7 like the Antarctic Treaty, side-stepped the
problem posed by conflicting positions regarding territorial claims.
The question of extracting hydrocarbons and minerals from
Antarctica poses some of the same issues. There are significant differences, however. Existing technical and economic data indicate
that Antarctic hydrocarbons and hard minerals, both on land and
in the adjacent continental shelf, cannot be extracted, transported,
and delivered to market at competitive prices, absent one or more
additional factors such as substantial increases in prices, an unusually large and valuable deposit, or sizable government subsidies.' 8
13. Id. art. VII.
14. Id. art. II.
15. See Mitchell, Undermining Antarctica: A Part to Regulate Mineral Exploitation
in Antarctica Threatens that Unique Environment, TECH. REv., Feb.-Mar., 1988, at 48, 52.
16. See Orrego Vicufia, The Law of the Sea and the Antarctic Treaty System: New
Approaches to Offshore Jurisdiction, in THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 97, 99 (C. Joyner &
S. Chopra eds. 1988).
17. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20,
1980, art. III, 33 U.S.T. 3476, T.IA.S. No. 10240.
18. See Dugger, Exploiting Antarctic Mineral Resources-Technology, Economics and
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If an imminent market for Antarctic minerals is improbable,
one might argue that there is no immediate need for a regulatory
system for mining to protect either the investor or the environment. In the absence of such a market, perhaps the United States
need not worry that an interest in minerals could stimulate political and legal disputes that might disrupt the stability of the
Antarctic Treaty system. However, one should bear in mind that
this is not entirely the case.
Commercial prospecting does not necessarily require the sizable investments demanded by intensive exploration and mining.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that oil and hard-minerals companies have some interest in increasing their understanding of
Antarctica's resource potential in the near future.1" Although commercial prospecting does not normally require a legal system for
protecting investments in a particular site, it raises fundamental
questions concerning the legal right to prospect and environmental
regulation. In theory, any territorial claimant might regard its existing mining laws as applying to all of its territory, including its
Antarctic territory. Yet if these claimants attempted to exclude or
regulate foreign prospecting based on their territorial claims, they
would provoke a dispute over the legal status of Antarctica."0 Similarly, if a non-claimant attempted to authorize or support prospecting by its nationals in a claimed area, a dispute would also
erupt." Either type of dispute would threaten the stability of the
Antarctic Treaty system.
Especially where mineral resources are involved, the possibility of a disruptive dispute triggered by prospecting is significant.
The ultimate object of mining is the physical removal of nonrenewable natural resources that claimant governments may even regard
as state property. 2 Mining also may entail significant alteration
and risk of degradation of the claimed area.2" Thus one might expect the territorial claimants to be more sensitive about activities
the Environment, 33 U. MIAMI L.REv. 315, 339 (1978).
19. See 38 U.N. GAOR C.A (42d mtg.) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/38/PV.42 (1983).
20. See U.S. Antarctic Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oceans & International Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1975) (statement of Claiborne Pell, Chairman).
21. See Shapley, Antarctica: World Hunger for Oil Spurs Security Council Review, 184
Scm. 776 (1974).
22. See 38 U.N. GAOR C.1 (44th Mtg.) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/38/PV.44 (1983) [hereinafter 44th Mtg].
23. Mitchell, supra note 15, at 55.
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preparatory to mining than many other activities. The possibility
of a dispute over prospecting could be enhanced by the temptation
to characterize or camouflage prospecting as scientific research permitted under the Antarctic Treaty.
Unless one side or the other abandons its basic political and
legal position, consensus among the territorial claimants and other
concerned states is essentially the only way to avoid a situation in
which prospecting or other mining activities trigger an international dispute that destabilizes the Antarctic Treaty system.
Agreement on a moratorium, or even a permanent ban, on
mining activities is the simplest option. It has considerable appeal
to some environmentalists, including the popular oceanographer,
Jacques-Yves Cousteau.24 To the extent, however, that one regards
a moratorium or permanent ban as either undesirable, or unlikely
to be accepted by each of the states whose agreement is important,
or unstable in the long run,15 one is faced with the challenge of
reaching agreement on the conditions under which prospecting or
other mining activities may occur. The new Antarctic Minerals
Convention26 seeks to resolve the matter by expressly permitting
prospecting activities with strict environmental limitations, and establishing rigorous political procedures and substantive conditions
for lifting what amounts to a legally binding moratorium on exploration and development.
In addition to these considerations, members of the United
Nations General Assembly have expressed an interest in the possibility of global negotiation over Antarctic mineral resources.2" This
very idea presents a challenge to the underlying premise of the
Antarctic Treaty system, namely, limiting active participation in
regulation to states with substantial interests and activities in Ant24. See Cousteau, Mining Interests' Greedy Eyes Focus on PristineAntarctica, Miami
Herald, Oct. 8, 1989, at 3C, col. 3.
25. If interests change, treaties can be denounced, amended, or replaced. Symbols
apart, the precise difference between a treaty that allows no development and one that establishes rigorous conditions for a collective political decision to permit development is that
the former is incompatible with a perceived change in interest, and thus risks a complete
collapse with no regulation if important states perceive such a change in interest. Even the
most ideologically committed authors of national constitutions nevertheless allow for flexi-

bility and change in response to new developments and ideas. We must distinguish between
protecting the future from the present and protecting the future from itself. Unless undertaken with great wisdom and sophistication, the latter exercise can easily descend into arrogance and futility.
26. See Convention, supra note 1.
27. See 44th Mtg., supra note 22, at 20.
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arctica.2 8 This challenge, at least potentially, endangers the stability achieved by the Antarctic Treaty system. To some degree, the
decision to complete the Convention now, within the framework of
the Antarctic Treaty system, was intended to forestall efforts to
deal with the question in the United Nations or some other global
forum.
The maintenance of political tranquility must, therefore, be
viewed as a primary, although not exclusive, reason for the negotiation of the Convention. Absent some significant legal and political
resistance to the territorial claims in Antarctica, it is unlikely that
states will ever reach agreement on direct international regulation
(or even prohibition) of mining for environmental or any other
purposes. From this perspective, disputes over the territorial
claims present not only a challenge but, to some observers, an opportunity to develop methods of international cooperation that can
have a positive effect on international relations generally.

II.

UNITED STATES INTERESTS

For purposes of analysis, United States interests affected by
the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources
can be divided into four general categories: economic interests; environmental interests; research and information interests; and political and strategic interests. Inevitably there is some tension between and among the different interests involved. Indeed, one can
expect the Convention, like a domestic statute, to reflect judgments about the appropriate balance between conflicting domestic
interests and the relative priority accorded to those interests. Also
one can expect the Convention to include judgments about the appropriate balance between the interests of the United States and
foreign states involved in the negotiation, and the relative priority
accorded to those interests.
A.

Economic Interests

As yet, it is unclear when extraction of Antarctic oil and gas or
other mineral resources will prove attractive to investors. The answer will depend in large measure on prices for the particular commodity, alternative sources of supply, and the value of a given re28. See Oxman, Antarctica and the New Law of the Sea, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 211,
213 (1986).
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source deposit in comparison to the substantial investments
required and risks posed by an extremely harsh and remote physical environment.
The United States shares with other consumers and importers
of hydrocarbons and minerals2" an interest in assuring that
Antarctic resources are available for extraction in response to market forces in order to meet world demand at minimum prices. It
may be argued that the very availability of this alternative source
of supply is useful, even if it is never utilized. Mere availability
could deter attempts to raise existing source prices to the point
where development of Antarctic resources becomes economically
attractive, or at least deter embargoes or other trade policies that
could persuade a consumer nation to subsidize development of
those resources.
The United States also has an economic (as well as political
and strategic) interest in the diversity and security of its sources of
supply of important commodities in order to avoid concentrated
dependence on foreign sources that may be subject to political or
military disruption or manipulation." This interest generally
points in the same direction as the consumer interest, although it
may introduce a preference for greater involvement by American
or allied companies. On the other hand, some domestic miners
could be expected to argue that security of supply is best assured
by encouraging investment in the United States rather than diverting capital to Antarctica. Alternatively, it might be argued that it
is preferable to use less secure supplies first, and keep more secure
supplies in reserve.
In addition, the United States has an interest in maximizing
the opportunities for productive economic activity by its nationals.
This interest would be advanced if the extraction and processing of
Antarctic mineral resources generates jobs for American employees
as well as direct or indirect revenues through the utilization of
American products and services. Domestic producers of a commodity might, however, argue that the development of foreign sources
of supply might prejudice this interest.
The United States also has an interest in minimizing the costs
29. See U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 1986 ENERGY STATISTIC YEARBOOK, at 158, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.J/30, U.N. Sales No. E/F.88.XVII.3 (1988) for

a listing of other consumers and importers of hydrocarbons and minerals.
30. See, e.g., U.S. Self-Sufficiency Keyed to Offshore Speed Up, 72 OIL & GAS J. 50
(1974).
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of administering any system of governance for Antarctic mineral
development. To the extent that these costs are not passed on to
miners, the U.S. taxpayer will bear a percentage of the costs. If the
costs are passed on to miners, the decrease in profitability may discourage investment.
In general, these economic interests suggest that the United
States should pursue the following objectives with respect to the
system governing Antarctic mineral resources:
1) facilitate investment in response to market forces by establishing necessary ground rules, ensuring predictability and security
of investment, and otherwise minimizing the restraints on
investors;
2) minimize the influence of governments or organizations hostile to consumer interests over the system of governance and the
resources;
3) maximize the opportunity for investment by American companies; and
4) minimize the cost of the system of governance.
B.

Environmental Interests

The Antarctic environment is unique, fragile, and largely unspoiled. Its ice comprises most of the world's fresh water.3 1 It supports wildlife in coastal areas and at sea.3 2 Marine mammals and
birds migrate to the Antarctic from great distances and hunt for
food. Increasing numbers of commercial fishermen are now joining
them."
The possibility of drilling and mining in Antarctica implicates
many environmental values. Preserving for present and future generations a vast wilderness on an increasingly settled and developed
planet has aesthetic, scientific, and moral value in and of itself.
Mineral development brings with it infrastructure and habitation
that have unavoidable impacts on the environment." ' Some mining
techniques could alter the landscape for long periods. 5 A signifi31.
32.
33.
34.

D.

SHAPLEY, THE SEVENTH CONTINENT ANTARCTICA IN THE RESOURCE AGE

1 (1978).

E. ORREGO VICURA, ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY 26-43 (1983).

Id. at 4, 21.
See CENTER

FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, ANTARCTIC POLITICS AND MARINE RE-

SOURCES: CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE

35. Id.

1980's, at 205 (1984) [hereinafter

ANTARCTIC POLITICS].
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cant oil spill from a rig or tanker could destroy many creatures and
despoil significant areas for a long time given the slow rate of decomposition in frigid climates. 3 ' The risks of accident in such a
harsh climate are high.37 Although much remains to be learned
about the relationship of the Antarctic environment to the global
environment, 8 we do know that substantial melting of Antarctic
ice would submerge coastal areas around the world. 9
The interest in preserving the wilderness suggests that there
should not be any development undertaken at all in the areas
sought to be maintained. If all of Antarctica were to be so preserved, that might end the matter, at least in theory.' If only part
of Antarctica is to be preserved as wilderness in which no mining
may occur at any time under any circumstances, then a mechanism
for selecting such areas is needed, and in the remaining areas the
interest in avoiding significant environmental degradation suggests
the need for a careful study of potential environmental impacts
before activities are permitted. In addition, before any development is undertaken, substantial assurances of sound environmental
practices by miners, as well as the capacity to avoid pollution and
minimize its effects, are necessary.
At the same time, however, the environmental effects on other
parts of the world of restricting mining in Antarctica must be
taken into account. It is conceivable that diverting investment
to alternative sources of supply could pose more immediate and
perhaps more serious environmental problems in some cases.
Whatever the substantive merits of a deliberate effort to control
demand by imposing legal and political restraints on new sources
of supply, the willingness of the public to support that strategy
once its effects are perceived is open to doubt.
In general, and subject to the foregoing caveats, these environmental interests suggest that the United States should promote
the following objectives with respect to the system governing
Antarctic mineral resources:
1) maximize the control of environmentally sensitive govern36. Dugger, supra note 18, at 332.

37. See F.
38.
39.
mental
117 (J.
40.

AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 251 (1982).
ANTARCTIC POLITICS, supra note 34.
See Zumberge, Potential Mineral Resource Availability and Possible EnvironProblems in Antarctica, in THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES
Charney ed. 1982).
See supra note 25.
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ments and organizations over the decision to proceed with mining
and the conduct of mining;
2) maximize the incentives to observe sound environmental
practices;
3) maximize research and the disclosure of data about Antarctica; and
4) avoid direct or indirect incentives (such as the absence of
taxes or royalties) that might make Antarctica more attractive for
investment than other parts of the world.
C. Research and Information Interests
Because of its unique location and characteristics, and because
it is largely unspoiled by man, Antarctica is a unique laboratory for
scientific research. The information gained directly and indirectly
from scientific research and other activities conducted there can
greatly enhance our knowledge not only about Antarctica, but also
about natural processes and phenomena generally. The quest for
knowledge is an end in itself. Moreover, experience demonstrates
that new knowledge, no matter how remote from practical use it
seems at the time, may well become the basis for significant practical developments in the future.
Placing minimum restrictions on scientific research and encouraging the public release of data and information collected by
scientists, miners, and others maximizes the availability of knowledge. At the same time, precluding or restricting human activity
that might significantly alter the environment, including the activity of scientists, maximizes the unique value of Antarctica as a
pristine natural laboratory.
In general, these interests parallel and reinforce the United
States' environmental interests. They also suggest that the United
States should pursue the following objectives with respect to the
system governing Antarctic mineral resources:
1) minimize regulatory controls and interference with scientific
research except as research activities might themselves impair scientific, environmental, and perhaps other important values in
Antarctica;
2) maximize controls on mining activity in areas of scientific
interest; and
3) maximize the incentives for disclosing data and information

28
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about Antarctica.
D. Political and Strategic Interests
The system established by the Antarctic Treaty serves United
States interests in stability,"1 access to all of Antarctica now and in
the future, 42 participation in the regulation of Antarctic activities
for environmental and other purposes,4" and avoidance of conflict
with the Soviet Union and others and the attendant expense such
conflict might entail.
The greatest potential challenge to the system derives from
the territorial claims. It would be naive to expect that the territorial claimants would accept significant United States participation
in the governance of Antarctica if they thought perfection of their
territorial claims could be achieved at an acceptable price. Indeed,
Argentina and Chile are particularly subject to strong nationalistic
pressures on the issue. 4
The challenge for United States policy is to discourage perceptions abroad that its opposition to the foreign territorial claims,
and its position that it has a basis for a claim itself, is weakening
or, as a legal matter, has been compromised. 5 The consequences of
gradually encouraging expectations of success among the territorial
claimants is an ultimate choice between direct confrontation or
abandonment of our position.
The broadening interest in Antarctica generated by the possible existence of valuable minerals has posed another threat to the
system's stability. This has manifested itself in increased attention
to Antarctica in the United Nations General Assembly."
The key to the success of the Antarctic system has been limiting the participation in regulatory decisions to states that conduct
activities there, 47 thus avoiding a dilution of influence by either the
territorial claimants or the non-claimants principally involved in
Antarctica. Once the decision-making group becomes too large,
41. ANTARCTIC POLITICS, supra note 34, at 28.
42. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII.
43. Id. art. IX ("agreed measures" provision).
44. See Alexander, Legal Aspects: Exploitation of Antarctic Resources-A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic Resource Problem, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371, 377 (1978).
45. F. AUBURN, supra note 37, at 55, 65.
46. See Alexander, supra note 44, at 398.
47. See F. AUBURN, supra note 37, at 123.
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unanimity is hard to achieve, while certain qualified majorities
could be achieved even without the participation of states with significant types of interests.
Although real, this threat can be exaggerated. The reason is
that most, if not all, states with significant interests in Antarctica,4 8 including the territorial claimants, share our interests in
avoiding a global decision-making system that does not adequately
account for the particular stakes involved for certain states. Indeed, U.S. over-reaction to this threat could convince the territorial claimants that the United States would rather add credence to
their claims than deal with the United Nations General Assembly.
It may also be argued that United States political interests are
engaged by the fact that the Convention could be used as a precedent for other matters.49 This argument might be true with respect
to regulation of other activities in Antarctica itself. It is open to
question, however, whether the Convention would serve as a useful
precedent for international negotiations in other areas, largely because of the special situation posed by the conflicting positions regarding territorial claims, the remoteness of Antarctica from most
of the world's other land masses, the influence of existing elements
of the Antarctic Treaty System, and the harsh, fragile, and largely
pristine environment.
The political and strategic interests set out above suggest the
following objectives for the United States regarding the system
governing Antarctic mineral resources:
1) maximize United States influence with respect to decisions
concerning any part of Antarctica;
2) maximize the influence of states substantially affected by
the decisions being taken;
3) avoid steps that could raise the expectations of the territorial claimants regarding special influence over their claimed areas;
and
4) discourage demands for a global regulatory system.
III.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEXT AND DECISION-MAKING POWER

The constituent instrument of an international organization
48. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX.
49. G. TRIcGs, supra note 5, at 46.
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normally seeks to protect underlying interests by detailing the
powers of the organization, particularly its decision-making organs.
A variety of techniques are used, usually in combination with each
other. They include specific enumeration of decision-making powers, specific criteria and conditions for the exercise of those powers,
and specific limitations and prohibitions regarding the exercise of
those powers.
The text of the constituent instrument should be the starting
point for an examination of the acceptability of any decision-making process. A provision for a decision by majority vote in a particular organ on a specific matter might be acceptable, but may be
wholly unacceptable in a different organ or on a different matter.
The more difficult question in relying on the text in the area
of institutional decision-making relates to the predictability that
textual limitations will function as restraints on decision-makers.
Words carved in stone can become elastic in the hands of lawyers,
diplomats, and politicians.
Four factors are probably of principal significance in predicting the restraining impact of textual limitations:
1) Clarity of the Text. The clearer the textual limitation, the
more difficult it is to evade. Precision and detail can be expected to
vary from issue to issue and are not always desirable in a constituent instrument of an organization expected to function for a significant period of time.
2) Reliability of the Decision-makers. In the abstract, reliable
decision-makers are ones who seriously attempt in good faith to
remain within their textual mandate. In a more immediate sense,
for the United States, reliable decision-makers are those who
would likely agree with, or at least not strongly oppose, the United
Statos' interpretation of the mandate."
3) Importance of the Issue. On one level, the more important
the issue, the greater the temptation to veer from the text. However, where the issue is of great importance to a minority or even
one state and may even affect its future cooperation or participation in the system, the majority may become very cautious. "Salami-slicing" on issues of moderate importance may be a greater
risk than catastrophic evasion of the textual mandate in the face of
50. See U.S.
1982).

POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

160 (S. Finger & J. Harbert eds.
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a strong objection. This tendency is particularly true if the dissenting state is important to the system and has the legal right and
practical ability to withdraw or react in a significant way.
4) Legal Review. The domestic law of many countries subjects
administrative agencies (and some legislatures) to judicial review
on the question of whether their actions are consistent with their
statutory or constitutional mandate. The same power can be accorded an international court or arbitral tribunal with respect to
an international organization.' The extent of the review and the
reliability of the judges or arbitrators then become significant factors in predicting adherence to textual limitations on decisionmaking powers.
The first three of the aforementioned factors will be analyzed
in connection with each decision-making organ. With respect to
the fourth factor, the Convention contains a system for compulsory
arbitration or adjudication of certain disputes between the states
party.5 ' This system could prove useful when a state party may be
violating the Convention, for example, by failure to fulfill its duty
to supervise its operators for compliance with environmental requirements. In addition, the Convention contemplates the establishment of an arbitral mechanism5" pursuant to which operators
or miners can challenge certain decisions by a Regulatory Committee regarding their management schemes and permits.54
A central difficulty is that the Convention text places significant constraints on the jurisdiction of any tribunal to review the
exercise of discretion by an organ established by the Convention. 5
It is unclear how broadly a tribunal will interpret these constraints. They could be construed in a manner consistent with the
traditions of many countries regarding judicial review of administrative agencies-that it is up to the reviewing tribunal to decide
whether the organ had the power under the Convention to act or
refrain from acting as it did, 6 but that it is not the function of the
tribunal to substitute its judgment for that of the relevant political
or administrative organ.5 7 It is also possible for the constraints to
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See J. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 88 (1984).
Convention, supra note 1, art. 56(1)(b).
Id. arts. 56(1)(b),(3),(5), 57(3)(b).
See id. art. 57(2).
See id.art. 57(5).
See id. art. 57.
Id. art. 57(5).
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be interpreted to require a tribunal to give complete deference to
any decision of an organ that can be characterized as
"discretionary." 58
This problem suggests the possible wisdom of including an interpretative statement, in any instrument of ratification, to the effect that the constraints on the jurisdiction of a tribunal to review
the exercise of discretion by an organ established by the Convention do not preclude it from determining whether that organ had
the power to decide as it did under the Convention, whether the
decision violated a substantive or procedural provision of the Convention, or whether that organ otherwise exceeded or abused its
powers.
IV.

MEMBERSHIP AND VOTING ARRANGEMENTS IN DECISIONMAKING ORGANS

One can analyze objectives concerning membership and voting
arrangements in international organizations with decision-making
power from three different perspectives: legitimacy, efficiency, and
influence. Like substantive interests, these organizational objectives conflict with each other to some degree and raise questions of
accommodation and priorities.
A.

Legitimacy

The question of the perceived legitimacy of any Antarctic
minerals regime bears on two particular United States interests.
The first interest is the economic and political objective of stability, which suggests that all states with a direct interest in the governance of Antarctic minerals activities-states that might have
the capacity and will to disrupt any system they found objectionable-should be encouraged to participate in the system or, at the
very least, to acquiesce in its operation.
The second interest, related to stability, is the political objective of protecting the existing Antarctic Treaty system and, in particular, discouraging challenges to the system in the U.N. General
Assembly or other international fora. This interest suggests the
need to accommodate the desires of states with less than substantial interests to participate in the system to a degree sufficient to
58. Id.
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dissuade such states from attempting to undermine the legitimacy
of the system.
B.

Efficiency

Organizational arrangements that run efficiently would serve a
variety of United States interests. 9 An efficient organization in the
context of an Antarctic minerals regime is one that concentrates
closely on its principal functions and the substantial interests involved and avoids political and ideological matters peripheral to
those functions.0 Generally speaking, the smaller and more directly interested the decision-making group, the more efficiently it
will operate, even where the direct interests conflict. The Commission,"1 and more especially the Regulatory Committee system of
the Convention, 2 are designed in part to reflect this interest in
efficiency.
C. Influence
The key question involved in granting decision-making power
to international organizations is whether and to what extent the
resultant decisions will be consistent with United States substantive interests. In this regard, one must distinguish carefully between two different types of interests in decision-making, namely,
negative and affirmative interests.
The negative interest is most frequently emphasized when analyzing the acceptability of decision-making procedures. The analytical question posed is: What is the probability that the United
States will be able to block a decision contrary to its interests?
In some instances, the affirmative interest can be equally important. The analytical question posed is: What is the probability
that the United States will be able to obtain a decision that is in
its interests?
The decision-making systems of the Convention, like most
voting systems in international organizations, proceed on the as59. See J. MYHRE, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: POLITICS, LAW,
(1986).
60. See A. PARSONS, ANTARCTICA: THE NEXT DECADE 121 (1987).
61. Convention, supra note 1, art. 18.
62. Id. art. 29.
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sumption that each state casts one vote.6 3 They attempt to accom-

modate states with more substantial interests by using two basic
techniques, often in combination. The first technique is to confine
some or all decisions to organs with a small membership, thereby
maximizing the affirmative and negative voting power of the small
group of members, some of whom may be guaranteed permanent
membership. This is true of the Commission6 4 and especially of the
Regulatory Committee system under the Convention. 5 The second
technique is to maximize protection" for negative interests by requiring more than a simple majority for some or all decisions, running the gamut from a two-thirds majority to a consensus, and possibly including requisite concurrent votes of certain states or
groups of states. Under the Convention, the Commission system
uses three-fourths majorities and consensus.6 6 The Regulatory
majorities and concurrent
Committee system utilizes two-thirds
67
majorities of its constituent groups.

There is an unavoidable trade-off in this system. The more
one seeks to enhance one's own blocking power, the more one is
compelled to grant similar power to at least some other states,
thereby making an affirmative decision more difficult. 8 It is of
course possible to convert negative power into affirmative power by
insisting on approval of one's affirmative agenda as a prerequisite
for allowing approval of someone else's affirmative agenda. The
difficulty is that every state or group of states with negative power
can play the same game.
The question of influence relates not only to the direct voting
power of the United States, but also to the voting power of states
likely to share or accommodate those interests. Where underlying
63. Weighted voting, in which each state is given a different number of votes in accordance with a formula designed to reflect relative interest or contribution, is used in some

commodity arrangements and funding institutions. See J

GOLD, VOTING AND DECISIONS

18

(1972).
64. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(2).
65. Id. art. 29(2).
66. Id. art. 22(1)-(3).
67. Id. art. 32(1)-(4).
68. The voting system in the U.N. Security Council amply demonstrates the virtues
and problems of negative voting power. According a veto to each of the five permanent
members tends to assure adequate support from the major powers for decisions with important international security implications and serves to protect each of them and their allies
from adverse decisions. At the same time, however, the veto power can substantially limit
the responsiveness of the Council to situations in which affirmative decisions are deemed
useful by the United States or other member states. See generally UN.CHARTER, June 26,
1945, art. 27, 59 Stat. 1035, 3 Bevans 1153.
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interests are complex, it is sometimes difficult to identify those
states with certainty. Some governments with which the United
States has very good bilateral relations attach considerable importance to their relations with Third World leaders or other voting
blocs in international organizations that frequently oppose the
United States on economic and political issues. Some major industrial states and U.S. political and military allies are territorial
claimants in Antarctica."9 At least juridically, the Soviet Union's
approach to Antarctica is similar to ours, yet its behavior in decision-making fora could be influenced by the general state of our
relations and divergent political or economic interests.
On a more subtle level, advocates of a particular United States
interest in Antarctica might be content to moderate the influence
of the United States against the contingency that a future United
States administration might not accord adequate priority to that
particular interest. For instance, some environmentalists might believe that United States interests are well served by a system that
maximizes the negative influence of any state over a decision to
proceed with mining, even if the United States representative were
supporting the decision. Similarly, some market-oriented economists might believe that United States interests are well served by
a system that minimizes negative governmental influence over a
decision to proceed with mining, even by United States representatives.
V.

DECISION-MAKING UNDER THE CONVENTION

The Convention establishes three basic organs. Two of these
organs are composed of all parties to the Convention: the Scientific, Technical and Environmental Advisory Committee,7" and the
Special Meeting of Parties."' One organ, the Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission, has a more limited membership. 2 In addition, if the Commission decides to open a part of Antarctica to
applications for exploration and development, an Antarctic Mineral Resources Regulatory Committee, 3 normally composed of ten
75
states,'7 4 would be established for the particular area identified.
69. J. MYHRE, supra note 59, at 7.
70. Convention, supra note I, art. 23(2).

71. Id art. 28(2).
72. See id. art. 18(2) for membership requirements.
73. Id. art. 29(1).
74. Id. art. 29(2).
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When considering the question of membership in the various
organs established by the Convention, one should bear in mind
that only parties to the Antarctic Treaty may become parties to
the Convention. 76 All members of the United Nations have the
Treaty, although many
right to become parties to the Antarctic
7
have not exercised that right to date. 7
In general, the smaller the organ, the more extensive its decision-making powers under the Convention. Each Regulatory Committee has broad authority to determine specific conditions of exploration and development. 78 The Commission sets general
standards on a number of matters,7 9 makes the basic decision to
0
open an area for exploration and development applications, and
has limited powers to review certain Regulatory Committee
decisions."'
A.

Advisory Committee and Special Meeting of Parties

The Advisory Committee8 2 reports to the Commission and the
Regulatory Committees on selected matters.8 " The Special Meeting
of Parties 8 ' reports to the Commission regarding the decision to
identify or open an area for exploration and development. 5 Both
the Advisory Committee and the Special Meeting of Parties are
designed to afford some opportunity for participation in the decision-making process to all parties to the Convention. 8 The Advitechnical, environsory Committee is also designed to encourage
87
sources.
all
from
input
scientific
and
mental,
The Advisory Committee and the Special Meeting of Parties
have no independent decision-making power and are required to
75. Id. art. 29(1).
76. Id. art. 60.
77. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. 13.
78. Convention, supra note 1, art. 31.
79. See id. art. 21.
80. Id. art. 21(1)(d).
81. Id. arts. 21(1)(1), 49. See infra app., table I setting forth the membership in each of
the Convention organs and table II identifying selected decisions, the organ which acts on
those decisions, and the requisite vote.
82. Id. art. 23.
83. See id. arts. 26, 27, 46(1).
84. Id. art. 28(1).
85. Id. arts. 28(1), 40(3).
86. Id. art. 41(1).
87. Id. art. 26(1).
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include all views in their reports.8 8 One may nevertheless expect-as the Convention requires-that for substantive as well as
political reasons their reports and recommendations would be seriously considered by the decision-making organs to which they
report.
B.

The Commission

Most substantive decisions of the Commission require a threefourths vote.8 9 The remainder require consensus, which is defined
as the absence of a formal objection."
1. Membership
At least twenty-two states, if they become a party to the Convention,9" would serve on the Commission: Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, and
Uruguay.
In addition, states sponsoring on-going exploration or development of minerals in Antarctica and states actively engaged in substantial scientific, technical or environmental research there may
be added as members.2 If such a state were a "Consultative
Party"9 3 to the Antarctic Treaty, it would take a vote of one-third
plus one of the existing Commission members to block an application to join; otherwise, any Commission member could block the
application. 4 Parties to the Antarctic Treaty have the right to become "Consultative Parties" during such time as they conduct substantial scientific research activity in Antarctica.9
88.
89.
90.
91.
treaty.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. arts. 27, 40(4).
Id. art. 22(1).
Id. arts. 22(2),(5).
Id. art. 18(2)(a). See infra app. for list of consultative parties and others to the
Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(2)(b),(c).
See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(4).
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX.
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2. Decisions Requiring a Three-Fourths Vote
Assuming an initial membership of twenty-two states, for matters requiring a three-fourths vote seventeen votes would be required for an affirmative decision and six votes would be sufficient
to block such a decision. It is unlikely that decisions perceived as
contrary to Western or industrial state interests could easily be
taken in this setting, although it is imaginable that the United
States might be unable to persuade the other industrial states to
support particular positions.
Should the membership of the Commission increase, the number of votes necessary to block a decision would increase proportionately, while the overall composition of the Commission might
shift away from its initial Western plurality. In the face of any
given application to become a member of the Commission, there is
an ever-present risk that most existing members, including the
United States, will prove to be more responsive to immediate political concerns than to the long-range problems posed by gradual enlargement and alteration of the balance of the Commission. For
example, the requirements in fact for becoming a "Consultative
Party" to the Antarctic Treaty (which facilitates Commission
membership) may continue to decline in rigor in response to the
political desire to discourage states from supporting U.N. involvement in Antarctica.
It will not be simple for any state to achieve the necessary
three-fourths vote for an affirmative decision on substantive matters in the Commission. The area where this might prove most
troublesome for the United States relates to environmental regulation and supervision. Initially, these concerns should not be too
significant because states that have no present plans to engage in
mineral development in Antarctica would have little immediate
reason to oppose strict environmental measures. Indeed, such
states may even perceive some economic advantage in slowing
down the leaders in the field.
If and when a "gold rush" mentality sets in, that is, if environmental regulation becomes a practical rather than anticipatory necessity, a growing number of states may regard strict environmental requirements as an impediment to investment both directly
and because the state that sponsors mining may itself become lia-
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ble for inadequate supervision of its miners. 6 One can easily imagine an argument claiming that a strict regime of environmental
regulation and liability is designed to favor the most advanced
companies from the wealthiest states.9 7 One can almost as easily
imagine that argument being made by a diplomatically skilled
proto-industrial state desirous of securing special privileges for itself by virtue of its characterization as a "developing" country.
It may be that the unusually strong environmental requirements of the Convention, 8 coupled with compulsory dispute settlement and a strong liability system likely to emerge in any liability protocol,99 are sufficient insurance against any such contingencies.
3.

Decisions Requiring Consensus

The most serious aspect of the Commission's decision-making
procedures relates to those decisions requiring consensus.
a) Amendment of the Convention
Amendment of the Convention is not permitted for the first
ten years. 10 Thereafter, adoption of an amendment at a meeting of
the parties requires a two-thirds vote' 01 (in some cases a threefourths vote' 02 ), including the concurrent votes of the Commission
members.' 3 Amendments thereafter enter into force only after rat04
ification, acceptance or approval by all Commission members.'
Once an amendment has entered into force, the other parties must
either accept it or be deemed to have withdrawn from the
Convention.' 5
This procedure permits the United States to block any amendment either at the adoption or ratification stage. At the same time,
if all the Commission members can agree, necessary amendments
96. Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(3)(a).
97. One can expect the Third World States to adopt such a position.
98. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 21(1)(c), 4(2).
99. See id. art. 57.
100. Id. art. 64.
101. Id. art. 64(3).
102. Id. art. 64(4).
103. Id. art. 64(3),(4).
104. Id. art. 64(5).
105. Id. art. 65(3).
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may be adopted in a reasonably efficient manner particularly when
one recalls that the effect of an amendment is to alter a state's
treaty obligations.
b) Monetary Matters
Consensus is required for decisions regarding budget and finance, notification and application fees and so-called "levies" on
miners to help defray the costs of administering the Convention
system.001 In general, United States interests are probably best
served by maximizing its negative voting power on these issues to
protect the finances of the United States and the miners. The requirement of a consensus on decisions regarding the distribution of
surplus revenues is also helpful. Such a requirement allows the
United States to ensure that its position regarding non-recognition
of territorial claims is not prejudiced by distributions based on
those claims, despite the presence in the text of a provision'0 7 that
could be interpreted to permit such distributions." 8
c) Non-Discrimination
Consensus is required for decisions to implement the principle
of non-discrimination under the Convention.' 0 9 The fact that such
implementation is subject to a consensus decision may imply substantial disagreement over the principle. Whatever the history of
this curiosity, it is likely that developing countries would prefer a
system of discrimination in their favor. In this regard, developing
countries could argue that such favoritism is implied by the way in
which the provisions on international participation in mining are
drafted. From this perspective, it may be just as well that the
United States could block any specific attempt at "implementation" of the non-discrimination principle.
The greatest problem in connection with the non-discrimination principle relates to the conclusion that it requires regulatory
implementation. This leaves open the argument that the principle
as set forth in the Convention is not self-executing, and that, absent implementation by the Commission, the provision cannot be
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id- art. 22(2)(a).
Id. art. 35(7)(b).
See generally infra app. table II.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(2)(b).
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invoked before an arbitral tribunal. This argument, while not difficult to rebut, introduces an element of uncertainty.
This problem aside, it is unlikely that the United States would
need to seek affirmative elaboration of the non-discrimination
principle. The United States could protect many of its interests
simply by relying on its ability to block specific decisions it regards
as discriminatory.
d) Identification of an Area for Exploration and Development
The most serious decision requiring consensus-and in some
respects the most serious single decision in the Convention as a
whole-is whether to open an area for applications for exploration
and development. 110 To the extent that the United States is reluctant for any reason, including environmental concerns, to see a
part of Antarctica opened to mineral activity, the consensus requirement ensures that the decision can be blocked. Indeed, the
need for a consensus makes it likely that the United States need
not take full responsibility for blocking the decision.
From the perspective of environmental interests, according a
treaty right to any one of at least twenty-two states to block a decision to open any part of Antarctica to exploration and development is as protective a procedure as one might imagine. Without a
treaty dealing with the matter, either a claimant or non-claimant
could, at any point, decide to exercise its asserted right to use Antarctica, in this case for minerals extraction purposes. On the other
hand, a treaty flatly prohibiting all mining in Antarctica could
come under strong pressure from parties or non-parties in the
event of a serious shortage of a significant commodity available in
Antarctica. Security needs or consumer pressure sufficient to persuade a state to take environmental risks (and attendant political
risks with respect to the environmental lobby) could well be sufficient to persuade that state to ignore or denounce a treaty banning
all mining in Antarctica. At that point, mining might occur without
the elaborate control and international supervision envisaged by a
convention that does not prohibit mining a priori but permits it
only when and if there is a broad consensus among concerned governments that the mining is environmentally safe.
The problem concerning this consensus requirement would
110. See id. art. 41.
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arise if and when the United States Government were to determine
that it is in its interests for the Commission to decide to open an
area of Antarctica to applications for exploration and development.
Any member of the Commission could block that decision.11' Because there is a possibility that at least some environmental groups
might oppose the decision or seek to impose conditions having the
same practical effect, Commission members would have a pretext
for voting "no," whatever their real motives.
Because the decision to open an area is irrelevant to prospecting, one can assume that the issue would probably arise after one
or more prospectors determined that there was sufficient incentive
to proceed with intensive exploration of a particular site. Still, it is
unclear what financial, temporal or other disincentives to proceeding with exploration might deter a state or company from seeking
to have an area opened to exploration applications relatively early.
This is particularly true because the initial effort would likely take
more time, due to the absence of precedent and experience within
the regulatory system. Therefore, while one might predict with reasonable confidence that actual mining development is unlikely absent a very valuable find and extremely favorable projected market
conditions (i.e., high demand and prices), it is not clear how far in
advance a serious effort would be made to "trigger" the system by
requesting the identification of an area for which applications to
explore would be received. The requirement that prospecting data
be revealed after ten years," ' unless that period is extended by
three-fourths vote of the Commission," 3 could itself serve to encourage early attempts to have an area identified and an exploration permit issued. On the other hand, data requirements in connection with identification of an area and issuance of an
exploration permit could deter early applications.
It is reasonably predictable that the greater the importance to
consumers of the decision to open an area, the greater the pressure
on Commission members not to exercise their right to veto the decision. The "nightmare" scenario of a Western community in desperate need of oil being frustrated by Commission vetoes is not
probable at the present time. If the situation were that critical to
the West, the threat to denounce the Convention would presumably be real and public opinion would either accommodate or su111. Id. art. 41(2).
112. Id. art. 37(12).

113. Id. art. 22(1).
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bordinate environmental objections.
However, some territorial claimants might at that point welcome the collapse of the Convention system. The need to proceed
with oil development would quickly be translated into a need, by
private companies in particular, for "recognized" exclusive rights
to the areas being intensively explored. A territorial claimant could
offer private companies a traditional public law basis for obtaining
private title, thereby encouraging the major Western non-claimants to recognize, or at least acquiesce in, the validity of title
granted by the claimants pursuant to their territorial claims.
Thus, a United States threat to withdraw in the event of an
unreasonable failure to open an area lacks some measure of credibility. The lack of credibility stems from the need for recognized
exclusive mining rights, coupled with the absence of a plausible alternative system for granting miners exclusivity which does not require abandoning the United States position of not recognizing foreign territorial claims and retaining a right of access to the entire
continent without foreign consent.
Were the United States to accept the Convention, this problem could be remedied in part by ensuring that the United States
is prepared to authorize mining by U.S. companies throughout
Antarctica in the event that the United States is forced to exercise
its right to withdraw from the Convention following unreasonable
failure to open an area. The purpose would not be to contemplate
withdrawal but, by making prudent preparation for such a contingency, to deter others from using their voting power in ways unreasonably prejudicial to U.S. interests.
The legislation implementing the Convention could simultaneously establish a fall-back domestic system that would become effective in the event that the United States withdrew from the Convention. Some aspects of the approach of the Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Act" might be examined in this regard. The legislation
could perpetuate any rights acquired by U.S. miners under the
Convention prior to United States withdrawal, establish a system
modeled on the Convention for domestic regulation and authorization of mining activities throughout Antarctica, prohibit United
States nationals from mining in areas already granted to other
United States nationals or nationals of reciprocating states, and
authorize reciprocal agreements with other governments for this
114. See generally Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (1982).
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purpose.
While the Commission as originally constituted will include
some oil exporters, none thus far has associated itself vigorously, if
at all, with attempts to cartelize the market for economic or political ends. However, the consensus requirement could inspire a more
committed member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries to make the investment in Antarctic research necessary
to become a Commission member, in order to gain control over the
decision to open an area.
An economically motivated move by an oil exporter to restrain
Antarctic production would probably stimulate most states active
in Antarctica to unite in opposition to such a move, partly because
most of the states are consumers and partly because most would
perceive that "their" system was being manipulated for outside
ends. In such an atmosphere, it is unlikely that the attempt to
block would long survive. However, there are two analogous situations in which one cannot be quite so sanguine about an attempt to
halt competing production from Antarctica. One situation would
arise if the oil exporter were a territorial claimant, particularly if
the area proposed to be opened were the area claimed. The other
situation would arise if the issue concerned hard minerals, rather
than oil, and the objecting state were a developing territorial
claimant that exports hard minerals, such as Chile.
The question of whether the consensus requirement is unduly
stringent because of the presence of the Soviet Union on the Commission demands careful analysis. The Soviet Union is certainly
capable of using its veto for purely political ends. Whether in particular circumstances the Soviet Union would find it in its interests
to use the veto solely for political gains is, however, another matter. If the question arose at a time when the Soviet Union were
seeking better relations with the West or more Western capital and
investment, the chances of a veto would be reduced. If the question arose at a time of high tension, the Soviet Union would nevertheless have to consider its interests in maintaining the stability of
the Antarctic system and possible interests as a consumer of the
commodity concerned. The Soviet Union would also have to weigh
its own interests in developing Antarctic mineral resources whether
for economic or political reasons. In that regard, the Soviet Union
would have to be as cautious about vetoing a U.S. request as the
United States would have to be about vetoing a Soviet one.
In sum, while the cataclysmic scenarios are extremely unset-
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tling, they are not very likely. Firm and prudent domestic legislation could help in this regard. The more serious problems posed by
the consensus requirement are two-fold: genuine disagreement
about whether opening the area is consistent with the requirements of the Convention, and price.
There are two sets of requirements under the Convention that
could spur genuine disagreement about whether the proposed conditions for opening the area satisfy the Convention, namely, environmental protection" ' and promoting international participation
in Antarctic minerals activities."' The consensus system gives the
benefit of the doubt to advocates of values implicit in either set of
requirements. The report to the Commission of the Special Meeting of Parties is likely to reflect the larger proportion of developing
countries and the presence of other states that do not conduct substantial activities in Antarctica on their own.
The first problem is less unsettling from the perspective of
United States interests. United States interests include the environmental interest. The United States is likely to be among the
more environmentally sensitive members of the Commission. U.S.
companies have substantial experience in working with environmental groups to achieve a generally satisfactory accommodation
of development and environmental goals. Any proposed activity
that survives the U.S. domestic political process might, but is not
likely to, attract strong and genuine foreign opposition on environmental grounds. This is particularly true because United States
environmental procedures and standards are likely to apply to any
decision by the United States government to propose the opening
of an area or to sponsor an applicant." 7
The second problem is more serious. Demands for participation in mining activities could emanate from a variety of sources.
For example, the Soviet Union might demand participation for political or economic reasons. A territorial claimant might demand
participation primarily to establish the principle that mining in the
area it claims requires the participation of its state or private companies, thereby guaranteeing accommodation of its claims in practice by states and companies interested in mining. Developing
countries might demand participation for ideological reasons. One
115. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.

116. Id. art. 6.
117. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982).
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could expect to find the economic interests of state or private companies in one or more proto-industrial states behind the ideological
rhetoric.
One may assume that a demand for participation is likely to
arise where market conditions would not otherwise make that participation appear attractive to an investor. Therefore, foreign participation may involve some economic cost to the investor. If the
concession is made to a territorial claimant regarding the area it
claims, there will also be political cost represented by the incremental damage to the U.S. position regarding the validity of the
territorial claims.
One may find some solace in the fact that the text of the Convention limits the role of the Commission to "elaborating opportunities" ' 1 8 for joint ventures or different forms of participation."81
There is also helpful interpretative language in the Final Act of the
Convention affirming the "freedom of choice" of an investor regarding partners in a joint venture, including the terms of their
Nevertheless, there is ample opportunity for barpartnership.'
gaining. Potential investors will have to consider that even if a veto
in the Commission can be avoided, both the Soviet Union and a
territorial claimant in the area in question will be members of the
relevant Regulatory Committee and thus will be in a position to
wreak further havoc if their interests are not accommodated. It
may take a larger dose of Oriental patience and French sang froid
to deal with the problem than some Americans, whether in government or industry, typically possess.
It is also imaginable that some Commission members will demand a price for their cooperation in supporting a decision to open
an area. Where the concession demanded is unrelated to the
Antarctic minerals regime, firm diplomacy may be sufficient to
deal with the matter. One cannot, however, exclude the possibility
that the issue will arise in a context in which potential investors
are in favor of the U.S. government paying an unrelated political
price.
The more complex scenario is one in which the price is directly relevant to the Antarctic minerals regime in general or to the
118. See Convention, supro note 1, art. 41.
119. Id.
120. Final Act of Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative meeting on Antarctic
Mineral Resources, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 865 (1988).
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specific proposal. A demand for participation is an example that
finds its basis in the Convention text itself." 1 Questions of style
and subtlety aside, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish unreasonable "blackmail" from reasonable demands for cooperation in
this context. "Log-rolling" is a time-honored characteristic of collective decision-making bodies. 12 2 The problem is more severe
when one needs to achieve consensus, but it can never be avoided
completely.
In sum, the requirement of consensus in the Commission to
open an area for receipt of exploration and development applications:
1) guarantees that no areas will be open for exploration and
development in Antarctica over the objections of the United
States;
2) comes close to guaranteeing that no area will be opened for
development over well-founded environmental objections;
3) provides no guarantee that any area of Antarctica will be
opened; and
4) subjects states seeking to open an area to a variety of demands that may have to be accommodated to achieve consensus.
Although this consensus requirement supplies a great deal of
protection for United States environmental and scientific interests,
it offers little protection for potential economic interests. It protects the United States interests in stability in Antarctica by guaranteeing the consent of all substantially interested states before
mining is undertaken. In actual operation, however, it may
prejudice the long-term stability of the current Antarctic system,
along with long-term United States political, legal, economic, and
environmental interests, by forcing substantial concessions to territorial claimants as the price for a decision to open an area. In
truth, the concessions made to the territorial claimants in the text
of the Convention itself may be an unsettling harbinger of things
to come.
In practice, consensus may well be achieved if the matter is
approached with patience, flexibility, and determination, but also
121. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 6.
122. "Log-rolling" is the "exchange of assistance or favors, such as political assistance
or favors, or the trading of votes by legislators to secure favorable action on projects of
interest to each other." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1331 (3d ed.
1976).
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absolute minimal zeal. A trial run in a small area of limited economic, scientific, and environmental importance might be undertaken in the early years under the Convention. The difficulty is
that such a trial run would represent a decision in principle that
all of Antarctica is not to remain permanently closed to all mineral
development. It is unclear that either a domestic or international
consensus exists on that issue. Yet another difficulty is that a trial
run, where significant economic interests are not directly engaged,
might accentuate political and ideological differences.
C.

The Regulatory Committees

1. General Role
Apart from fairly elaborate provisions on environmental protection, 1 3 the Convention does not contain a detailed mining code
or set of regulations. Rather, it relies on general guidelines and
some specific requirements and prohibitions in much the same way
as a general statute delegating authority to an administrative
agency.
With respect to exploration and development, most of the regulatory system will be put into place for each area of Antarctica
when that area is opened by the Commission for receipt of applications for exploration and development."' Some of the conditions
and guidelines will be specified by the Commission at the time it
identifies the area.'25 Most conditions and guidelines will be determined by the Regulatory Committee established for the particular
area either by general regulation or in the context of the management scheme applicable to a certain operator in a particular block
within the larger area for which the designated Regulatory Com126
mittee is competent.

This system has the advantage of flexibility. It defers decisions
on precise regulations until there is a practical need and until more
information is available to inform those decisions. The system also
has the advantage of placing important decisions as to detail in the
hands of a relatively small Regulatory Committee composed
largely of more interested states. Unfortunately, it also leaves a
123.
124.
125.
126.

See generally Convention, supra note 1, arts. 2, 4, 13, 27, 41.
Id. art. 41.
Id.
Id. art. 43(2)(a),(3).
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great deal of uncertainty regarding the nature of the precise conditions with which a miner must comply.
It would not appear that this uncertainty will significantly deter prospecting, which does not require a permit under the Convention and which may take place prior to the identification of an
area for exploration and development. Miners are generally used to
a system under which investments in prospecting will not necessarily entitle them to exclusive rights to explore or exploit in the area
in which they conduct prospecting. If, as the Convention contemplates, the uncertainties are resolved at the time a miner is prepared to commit substantial capital to exploration and development of a specific block, uncertainty regarding the nature of
regulatory conditions would not, as such, be an impediment to investment at that stage.
Overall, this system poses two critical questions: 1) What is
the likelihood that the detailed regulations and management
scheme will prove acceptable to potential miners, particularly miners from the United States and other market economies, and to the
United States with respect to the full range of its interests? and 2)
What is the extent of the security and predictability afforded to
miners once the Regulatory Committee approves the management
scheme and exploration permit?
The answers to the two questions depend in large measure on
predictions about the behavior of the Regulatory Committees. In
this regard, one must bear in mind the tension between United
States interests in blocking adverse decisions and achieving affirmative decisions. The easier it is to block decisions, the easier it will
be for the United States to prevent adverse regulatory decisions.
No mining at all might take place under bad regulatory conditions.
It is equally true, however, that no mining at all can take place
unless the requisite number of affirmative votes for various decisions can be assembled.
If the United States had been opposed to opening the area at
all to exploration and development, its veto in the Commission
would be sufficient to stop the decision to open the area or ensure
the inclusion of necessary environmental or other conditions. Thus
it is likely that at the Regulatory Committee stage, the United
States will either favor proceeding with exploration and development or, at the very least, not be strongly opposed. In such a setting, the smaller the number of votes necessary to block a Regulatory Commission decision, the greater the likelihood that the
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United States, while finding it relatively easier to block decisions
imposing objectionable requirements, will find it relatively more
difficult to achieve the affirmative decisions necessary to permit exploration and development to proceed. Nevertheless, opposition to
opening the area or insistence on certain conditions on the part of
other members of the Regulatory Committee also normally would
have arisen in the Commission. This suggests that the Regulatory
Committees may not pose insurmountable obstacles to desirable
affirmative decisions.
2.

Composition

Each Regulatory Committee will normally be composed of
representatives of ten states that are members of the Commission.'2 7 Six non-claimants, including the United States and the Soviet Union, will be members of each Regulatory Committee.' 2 8
Four territorial claimants will also be selected for each Committee.129 The four claimants will include the state or states making
territorial claims in the area identified13 and other territorial
claimants effectively selected by the state or states making territorial claims in the area identified. The ten members must include
states that contributed substantial scientific, technical or environmental information relevant to identification of the area over
which the Regulatory Committee will be competent as well as at
least three developing countries.'
3. Application Procedures
The Regulatory Committee will first establish procedures for
receipt of applications for exploration and development permits.'3 2
Subject to any decisions by the Commission regarding maximum
127. In the event that a state sponsoring prospecting, exploration or mining development in the specific area concerned is not one of the 10 members of the Regulatory Committee, that state has the right to be added as a member for specific periods and purposes. The
sponsor of prospecting serves only until it applies for an exploration permit. The sponsor of
exploration or mining development participates in decisions affecting only the activities it
sponsors and need not be a Commission member. See id. art. 29(6).
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.

art. 29(2)(c)(i).
art. 29(2)(a).
art. 29(3)(a),(b).
art. 43(2)(d),
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block size and application fees,"'3 it will divide the area into blocks
and set the relevant application fees."3
These procedures may include a limit on the number of blocks
that may be accorded to any given Party.3 5 One should note in
this regard that operators or miners must have a substantial and
genuine link with their sponsoring state. 3 '
The Regulatory Committee will also establish procedures for
resolving competing applications for the same block where the applicants have not resolved the matter themselves by means of their
own choice.13 7 Those procedures must include giving priority to the
application with the broadest participation among interested parties, including developing countries in particular.
These decisions require a two-thirds majority of the states
present and voting, that is seven out of the normal ten votes.1 38
States that abstain are normally not considered to be "voting." '
Four negative votes would be necessary to block a decision if there
were no abstentions or only one abstention. If there were between
two to four abstentions, three votes would be sufficient to block. 40
To the extent that an issue surfaces relating to a difference in
principle with the territorial claimants, the four claimants, if
united, will be able to block any decision favored by the six nonclaimants.
To the extent that an issue arises relating to the general interests of Western consumer nations, the United States should not
normally find it too difficult to find three additional negative votes
(or two additional negative votes and two abstentions) to block adverse decisions. The four territorial claimants on the Committee
will come from among the following group: Argentina, Australia,
Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. At
least two of the four claimants might normally be expected to
share many of the same interests as the United States or at least
favor accommodation of substantial United States concerns. In
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
with the

Id. art. 43(2)(a).
Id. art. 43(2)(b).
Id. art. 43(2)(a).
See id. art. 44(2)(a).
Id. art. 43(2)(e).
Id. art. 32(4).
Id.
See infra app., table III which correlates the number of votes necessary to block
number of abstentions or absences.
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that case, the United States would need to persuade only one of
the five other non-claimants of its point of view. It is probable that
the non-claimant group will include at least one additional Western state, for example an European Economic Community member
or Japan, particularly if the four claimants include only two Western states. Moreover, at least on monetary questions such as fees,
the Soviet Union can be expected to be conservative.
Nevertheless, the United States is a possible target of a move
to limit the number of blocks that can be granted to any given
party. The Soviet Union and some United States allies, such as
France, have favored similar limitations in other contexts. Given
the multinational nature of the oil and mining industries, as well
as the capacity to establish subsidiaries with substantial and genuine links to foreign states, the extent to which the risk of an adverse decision on this point should give rise to serious underlying
economic concerns is unclear. In practice, this risk adds some pressure to assure' international participation in exploration applications.
4.

Guidelines

The Regulatory Committee is required to adopt guidelines
identifying the general requirements for exploration and development in the area of its competence."' These guidelines will cover a
large number of detailed items normally associated with mining
regulations.' 42
The adoption of such guidelines requires a two-thirds majority, 3 as well as the votes of half the claimants and half the nonclaimants present and voting."' Blocking power is thereby increased. A territorial claimant, including the state with a territorial
claim in the area in question, would need to persuade only two
other claimants to support its position in order to block a decision
even if there are no abstentions.
Under this formula, the United States would still need to persuade at least three other states to vote "no" in order to block a
decision. The difference is that fewer states need to abstain to reduce the number of states the United States would have to per141.
142.
143.
144.

Convention, supra note 1, art. 43(3).
Id. art. 47.
Id. arts. 32(2), 48.
Id.
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suade to vote "no." For example, if one non-claimant abstained,
the negative votes of only three non-claimants would be sufficient
to block.' 5
The primary impact of this formula is to increase the power of
the claimants in general, and more specifically, the claimant making claims within the area in question. The formula strengthens
the claimants' ability to extract practical or legal concessions to
the territorial claims. An extreme example of this power would be
a demand that the guidelines conform in significant respects to the
mining laws of the state that claims sovereignty in the area.
This formula may have the additional effect of increasing the
power of states interested in forcing broader participation, a group
potentially including claimant and non-claimant developing countries, the Soviet Union, other claimants, and other non-claimants.
While the text does not provide a clear basis for making participation demands at this stage,""6 it is politically possible that these
demands will have to be met to overcome an objection grounded
publicly on the need to respect the Commission's elaboration of
opportunities for participation or on environmental or other requirements referred to in the relevant text.
5.

Approval of Exploration Permit and Management Scheme

The Regulatory Committee has the authority to approve an
exploration permit and management scheme or contract.1 47 The
approval of an exploration permit and management scheme in a
specific block grants an operator or miner exclusive rights to explore for the resources identified and to develop (mine) those resources, subject to subsequent issuance of a development permit.4 "
The management scheme sets out the specific terms and conditions
for both exploration and development.' 4 9 Those terms and conditions must be consistent with the Convention and applicable regulations and guidelines adopted either by the Commission or the
145. See infra app. table III which correlates the number of votes necessary to block
with the number of abstentions or absences.
146. The list of items in article 47 cross-referenced by article 43(3) does not include
participation. Some states might argue however that the guidelines are not necessarily limited to the items covered by article 47, and that the article 47 list itself is expressly nonexhaustive. See id. arts. 43(3), 47.
147. Id art. 48.
148. Id.
149. Id. art. 47.
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Regulatory Committee and would include procedures for settlement of disputes between the operator and the Regulatory
Committee.15
When considering the application and management scheme,
the Regulatory Committee is required to "have recourse"'' to certain of its members: the sponsoring state, any state making claims
in the area in which the Regulatory Committee is competent, and,
as may be required, one or two additional Committee members.' 52
The meaning of this requirement is unclear. A procedural right to
be deeply involved in the process is suggested. The provision may
imply a core negotiating or drafting group, or some less structured
form of consultation. The reference to "one or two" additional
members' 5 3 may imply that the United States and the Soviet
Union are to be included in all cases, although there appears to be
no formal pronouncement in the Final Act to this effect.
The approval of a management scheme by the Regulatory
Committee constitutes authorization for the issuance of an exploration permit without delay." The decision to approve the management scheme requires a two-thirds vote of the Regulatory Committee, including a majority of the votes of claimants and nonclaimants. 1 5 Absent abstentions, this means that either two claimants or three non-claimants could block the decision.'5
This formula increases the ability of the United States to
block an adverse decision. Absent abstentions, the United States
would need to persuade either two other non-claimants or two
claimants to vote "no." This scheme also increases the difficulty of
achieving affirmative decisions, particularly in light of the fact that
two claimants could block the decision.
The potential difficulties that the United States may encounter in achieving an affirmative decision to approve a management
scheme are essentially the same as the problems identified in connection with the adoption of guidelines by the Regulatory Committee. From the simple perspective of vote counting, those difficulties
are somewhat increased. However, one should consider that the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. art. 47(r).
Id. art. 46.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 48.
Id. art. 32(2).
See infra app., table III.
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management scheme must be consistent with the guidelines
adopted by the Regulatory Committee and therefore a number of
issues may be treated as resolved.
6.

The Development Permit

The holder of an exploration permit pursuant to an approved
management scheme may apply to the Regulatory Committee at
any time for a development or mining permit for the block and
resources covered. 5 7 Various provisions of the management
scheme, including time limits and performance requirements applicable to the exploration and development stages, 58 are likely to
influence the timing of an operator's application.
It is likely that the applicant for a development permit will
have made substantial investments in exploration of the block."5 9
The risk that a development permit will not be issued or will be
subject to new and onerous conditions can therefore have a deterrent effect on investment during the exploration stage. This risk
may be reduced by specifying time limits and performance requirements in the management scheme consistent with a fairly early application for a development permit, thus reducing the amount of
investment needed prior to approval of the development permit.
The function of the Regulatory Committee at this stage is to
consider whether modifications are necessary in the management
scheme."8 " The Convention declares two reasons for such modifications. First, the application reveals modifications by the operator
to the planned development envisaged at the time the management scheme was approved.' Second, as a result either of changes
in the planned development or increased knowledge, the development would cause impacts on the environment that were previously unforeseen.'
Article 32, Paragraph 1, of the Convention provides that decisions by a Regulatory Committee "pursuant to" Article 54(5) shall
be taken by a two-thirds majority vote, including a majority of the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Convention, supra note 1, art. 53.
See id. art. 45.
See id. art. 53(2).
Id. art. 54(4).
Id. art. 54(3)(a).
Id. art. 54(3)(b).

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

56

[Vol. 21:1

votes of claimants and a majority of the votes of non-claimants."'
This is the same majority required for original approval of the
management scheme. 164 Absent abstentions, either two claimants
or three non-claimants could block the decision.'
Article 54, Paragraph 5 of the Convention provides:
"If the Regulatory Committee in accordance with Article 32 approves modifications [to the management scheme], or if it does not
consider that such modifications are necessary, the Regulatory
Committee shall issue without delay a development per.
mit. . .

Undoubtedly, then, the approval of modifications to the management scheme would be a decision "pursuant to" Article 54(5)
requiring the concurrent majorities specified in Article 32, Paragraph 1.167 It would be relatively easy to block such a decision. It is
also clear that once modifications are approved, the development
permit must be issued. 6 " It must be borne in mind, however, that
states might seek to block modifications either because they oppose them or because they favor more extensive modifications.
A new question then arises: What happens if the requisite majority does not vote in favor of any modifications to the management scheme? The Regulatory Committee is required to issue a
development permit without delay if it does not consider that such
modifications are necessary. How, and when, does one know that
the Regulatory Committee "does not consider that such modifications are necessary"?
Three answers to this question are possible:
1) The exhaustion of efforts to achieve the requisite support
for modifications within a reasonable time means that the Committee does not consider that such modifications are necessary
and, hence, it is required to issue the development permit without
delay;
2) The Committee must take an affirmative decision, by the
qualified majority specified in Article 32, Paragraph 1, that it does
not consider that such modifications are necessary before it is re163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. art. 32(1).
Id. art. 48.
See infra app., table III.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 54(5).
Id. arts. 32(1), 54(5).
Id.art. 54(5).
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' or
quired to issue the development permit without delay; 69
3) The Committee must take an affirmative decision by a
lesser majority that all reasonable efforts to achieve the requisite
support for modifications have been exhausted before it is required
to issue the development permit without delay. The requisite vote
in this case might be the two-thirds majority required by Article
32, Paragraph 3, for matters of substance generally or the simple
majority required by Article 32, Paragraph 4, for matters of procedure.17
The precise text of Article 54 tends to support the first interpretation. Article 54 makes no reference to an affirmative decision
to approve a development permit. 1" Paragraphs 3 and 4 address
the question of modifications to the management scheme."7 2 The
text of Paragraph 5 does note refer to a decision not to modify the
management scheme or even to a decision that modifications are
unnecessary.' 3 The relevant requirement for issuance of the development permit is that the Regulatory Committee "does not consider that" modifications to the management scheme are necessary.'74 Thus the language of the text itself suggests that what is
meant is the absence of a decision to modify the management
scheme and not an affirmative decision to the contrary.
The grammatical structure of Article 54, Paragraph 5, is inconsistent with the second interpretation, namely, that an affirmative decision in accordance with Article 32 is required stating that
modifications are not necessary." 5 The text does not say, "If the
Regulatory Committee in accordance with Article 32 approves
modifications or does not consider that such modifications are necessary." Such a text might plausibly, if somewhat awkwardly, be
interpreted to mean "If the Regulatory Committee in accordance

with Article 32 . . . does not consider that such modifications are

necessary." But the actual text of Article 54(5) contains additional
punctuation and repeats the word "if.'

7

1

Adding emphasis to the

additional language, what the text states is, "If the Regulatory
Committee in accordance Article 32 approves modifications under
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
See id.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id.
See id.
Id. art.

art. 32(3),(4).
54.
54(3),(4).
54(5).
arts. 54(5), 32.
54(5).
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Paragraph 4 above, or if it does not consider that such modifications are necessary." 1" The cross-reference to Article 32 does not
apply to the clause following the comma and the word "if." Article
32 governs all affirmative decisions by the Regulatory Committee 178 and the failure to apply the cross-reference to Article 32 to
the clause following the comma suggests that no affirmative decision is required.
Proponents of the first interpretation might argue that the
language of Articles 47, 48, and 50 reinforces their view. 179 Article
47 requires that the management scheme approved in connection
with the exploration permit prescribe the specific terms and conditions for both exploration and development."' Proponents of the
first interpretation might argue that this does not make much
sense if Article 54, Paragraph 5 is interpreted to mean that the
Regulatory Committee must in effect approve not only modifications but the original terms and conditions for development again
by the same majority."s'

Article 48 grants the operator (miner) whose management
scheme is approved exclusive rights both to explore and develop
the resources. 1 2 While the latter right is subject to issuance of the
development permit, 8 the inclusion of the reference to development in Article 481" is given little or no effect if all that is meant
is that the miner will have the exclusive right to apply for a development permit, subject to precisely the same affirmative vote, and
thus to precisely the same uncertainties, that the miner faced when
applying for the exploration permit.
The language of Article 54 parallels the language of Article
48.85 Under Article 48, once the management scheme is approved,
the exploration permit is to be issued "without delay. '"1 6 No separate affirmative decision to issue the exploration permit is required. This might suggest to proponents of the first interpretation
that the parallel language of Article 54 should be interpreted in the
177. Id. (emphasis added).

178. See id. art. 32.
179. See id. arts. 47, 48, 50.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. art. 47.
See id. art. 54.
Id. art. 48.
Id.
Id.
Compare id. art. 54 with id. art. 48.
See id. art. 48.
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same way."' The question requiring affirmative decision is whether
to amend the management scheme. No separate affirmative decision to issue the development permit is required.
Article 50 refers to the procedure in Article 54 as an exception
to the rule that no management scheme may be modified without
the consent of the sponsoring state. 8' This arguably reinforces the
view that Article 54 was regarded as a modification procedure, not
a re-approval procedure.' 8 9
Accordingly, one could conclude that the first interpretation of
the text is the best, namely, that the exhaustion of efforts to
achieve the requisite support for modifications in a reasonable
time means that the Committee does not consider that such modifications are necessary, and that it is then required to issue the
development permit without delay.
From an environmental point of view, this interpretation is
subject to the objection that it gives less substance to Article 54
than is already contained in Article 51, which permits the Regulatory Committee to modify a management scheme at any time, for
stated environmental reasons, by a two-thirds vote.19 Proponents
of this view would argue that development entails additional risks
to the environment that require an affirmative policy decision by a
broad majority before they are judged acceptable.
One might point to Articles 49 and 59 to support this argument. 9' Article 49 provides for the possibility of review by the
Commission of "a decision by [a] Regulatory Committee to . . .
issue a development permit."' 92 Article 59, Paragraph 1, Clause b,
refers to the possibility of arbitration between a miner or sponsoring state and a Regulatory Committee regarding "a decision to decline the issue of a development permit."'1 9 3 Proponents of the second interpretation would argue that these portions of the
Convention suggest that an affirmative decision to issue or to decline to issue a development permit is contemplated.
Supporters of the first interpretation would argue that while it
is true that investors run the risk that a two-thirds majority might
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Cf. id. art. 54.
See id. art. 50.
See id. art. 54.
Id. art. 51(1).
See id. arts. 49, 59.
Id. art. 49(1).
Id. art. 59(1)(b).
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alter the management scheme for stated environmental reasons
under Article 51,194 that is a far cry from running the risk that two
or three states, by blocking the issuance of a development permit,
could render the investment in exploration useless. Their position
would be that the stringent requirements for consensus in the
Commission to open an area.9 and for concurrent majorities in the
Regulatory Committee to approve the management scheme, 19 represent the appropriate time for according a small minority the
power to block economic activity, namely before substantial investments have been made.
In this connection they might also note that even where a twothirds majority modifies a management scheme under Article 51,
the text expressly contemplates the possibility of compensation to
the investor. 197 No such provision appears in Article 54.199 It would
be anomalous to argue that a small minority is empowered to impair investments without compensation, while a two-thirds majority is not.
With respect to Articles 49 and 59, they might argue that
these provisions are peripheral to the main articles dealing with
the question, and are simply not drafted as carefully as they might
have been.' 9 9 Thus, for example, Article 59 also refers to arbitration of a decision to decline a Management Scheme, 00 whereas the
directly applicable Article 48 contemplates only a decision to approve, not an affirmative decision to decline, a management
scheme.2 0
Given the fact that Article 54 is not a model of clarity, and
that differing interpretations may be proffered not only by different states, but by different groups in the United States, it might be
prudent to attach a specific statement of interpretation on this
point, approved by the United States Senate, to any instrument of
ratification. Such a statement is, however, no guarantee that other
states or, if the matter is brought to arbitration, a tribunal will
agree. The main object of any statement would be to enhance the
bargaining leverage of the United States with respect to both its
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. art.
See id.
See id.
Id. art.
See id.

art. 51(1).
arts. 21, 22.
art. 32(1).
51(6).
art. 54.
arts. 49, 59.
59(1)(a).
art. 48.
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economic and environmental interests.
Without minimizing the importance of economic and environmental values implicated by this issue, it may be that the risks
posed by the lack of clarity in Article 54 are not as great as the
underlying conflicting positions of principle might suggest. It is
reasonably clear that absent modifications to the planned development proposed by the miner, the only relevant issue under Article
54 relates to previously unforeseen impacts on the environment.
Politically difficult issues, such as participation, will already have
been settled at the time the management scheme was originally approved. Thus, while one can never completely exclude the use of
environmental objections as a pretext, it does not seem very likely
that the underlying problem will involve more than an accommodation of new environmental concerns.
From this perspective, the investor may in fact welcome the
chance to resolve any new environmental problems before proceeding with additional significant investment associated with actual
development. The alternative, should the environmental critics
turn out to be correct in predicting new environmental risks, could
be a far more costly suspension of operations or modification of a
management scheme under Article 51 at a later stage.
Conversely, environmental critics would have to be cautious
about the implications of raising new environmental problems in
the context of Article 54.2'2 The fact that they raised those concerns at the time the application for a development permit was
under consideration could make it more difficult to argue later
under Article 51 that operations should be suspended because of
environmental impacts beyond those previously judged acceptable
by the Regulatory Committee. 0 3
The fundamental political problem with both the first and second interpretations is that they swing the balance very far in the
direction of blocking power given the stringent concurrent majority
required by Article 32, Paragraph 1.204 However, the first interpretation would only have this effect when, and if, it is decided that a
reasonable time for reaching agreement on modifications has
elapsed. It is not very likely that a tribunal would be willing to
make that determination in the absence of extreme circumstances.
202. See generally id. art. 54.
203. See id. art. 54(3),(4).
204. See id art. 32(1).
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Thus, the true advantage of the first interpretation is that it leaves
room for judicial intervention in extreme cases while, in normal
cases, increasing the leverage of the majority under the third interpretation. In this regard, it should be noted that while the third
interpretation is technically a legal variant of the first, as a practical matter it represents a compromise between the first and second
interpretations.
7. Suspension, Modification, Cancellation, and Penalties
The Regulatory Committee has the power to suspend, modify,
or cancel a management scheme as a result of impacts on the environment beyond those judged acceptable pursuant to the Convention." 5 It also has the power to take such action, or to impose a
monetary penalty, in the event an operator (miner) violates the
Convention, measures adopted under the Convention, or the management scheme.20 6 The response must be proportional to the seriousness of the violation.2 7
The power of the Regulatory Committee in these respects is
subject to general measures previously adopted by the Commission.2° Those measures may include provision for compensation to
the miner, presumably for certain losses incurred as a result of action taken by the Regulatory Committee in response to new environmental concerns.20 9
The power of the Regulatory Committee in these respects will
also be subject to arbitration.2 1 If it finds that the Regulatory
Committee acted unlawfully, the arbitral tribunal would presumably have the authority to award damages to the operator, determine that the Committee may not take the action contemplated, or
both.
Decisions of the Regulatory Committee on these matters require a two-thirds vote.2" There is no requirement here for concurrent majorities. Thus, absent abstentions, the United States would
205. See id. art. 51(1). This seems to mean impacts beyond those judged acceptable at
the time relevant decisions regarding the opening of the area and the management scheme

were taken.
206. Id. art. 51(3)(d).
207. Id. art. 51(4).
208. Id. art. 51(6).

209. See id.
210. See generally id. arts. 56, 57; see also id. annex for an arbitral tribunal.
211. See id. art. 32(1).
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have to obtain three other negative votes to block a decision.
On its face, it seems odd that Regulatory Committee decisions
on such matters would not require a more stringent majority.
There may be three explanations for this. First, it should not be
unduly easy to block a decision to make environmental adjustments. Second, Regulatory Committee decisions that the operator
has committed a violation of its obligations do not, as such, involve
the exercise of discretionary judgment, and therefore are easily
subject to review by arbitrators.2 2 Third, the small size of the Regulatory Committee and the proportionately large number of Western consumer states likely to be members means that a smaller
number of votes are necessary to block a decision requiring a twothirds majority, and may be obtained more easily, than would be
the case in a larger decision-making body of different composition.
Given the availability of arbitration, the size and likely composition of the Regulatory Committees, and the possibility that the
Commission's general measures will add protections for the investor, it may not be very likely that arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power by a Regulatory Committee on these matters will occur. Even if this is so, and even taking into account the unique
environmental concerns in Antarctica, were a mere two-thirds voting requirement to be regarded as a precedent in other contexts,
there would certainly be reason for concern. '
VI.

TREATMENT OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

The parties to the Antarctic Treaty and other treaties negotiated in the context of the Antarctic Treaty have consistently recognized the necessity of including the territorial claimants in the
decision-making processes.21 The Antarctic Treaty and other trea212. This is not true of decisions as to sanctions, because the choice of sanctions involves some exercise of discretion within the broad requirement of proportionality to the
seriousness of the violation.
213. By way of comparison, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, suspension or modification of operations for environmental reasons for more than 30
days requires a consensus decision of the 36-member Council; sanctions for violations by a
miner require a three-fourths majority, cannot be imposed until there has been judicial review and may include suspension or termination of the right to mine only in cases of serious,
persistent and willful violations and after warnings to the miner. U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, arts. 162(2)(t), (u), (w), 185, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1302, 1306 (1982).
214. See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX; see generally Agreed Measures
for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, June 2-13, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S.
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ties negotiated prior to the Convention protected all interests, including those of the territorial claimants, by requiring a consensus
or unanimity for binding decisions.' 15 Nowhere in the Antarctic
Treaty, or in other treaties related to Antarctica negotiated prior
to the Convention, is a territorial claimant either given an express
right to a special position by virtue of being a claimant, or accorded any express right to a special role with respect to the particular area it claims.
The Convention departs radically from this tradition. It explicitly establishes a decision-making structure for Regulatory
Committees that divides claimants and non-claimants into separate groups. 1 6 Any given territorial claimant on a Regulatory Committee has greater capacity to block the most important decisions
than any given non-claimant.
In addition to these general concessions to territorial claimants, specific concessions are also made. A state making a territorial claim to a particular area has, by virtue of that claim to that
particular area:
1) a right to serve on a Regulatory Committee established for
7
an area that includes the area it claims;
2) a right in effect to decide which of the other territorial
claimants will sit on that Regulatory Committee, giving it potential
influence over the way they will vote transcending mere similarity
of interests;2 1
3) a right to demand that a Regulatory Committee "have recourse" to it in considering an application2 1 9for an exploration permit and the related management scheme;
4) a possible argument that its interests are entitled to special
respect in any disposition of surplus revenues from the area it
claims; 220 and
5) a possible argument that it has a duty to take measures in
No. 6058 (1966), modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 7692 (1973); Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826; Convention
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, supra note 17.
215. See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. XII.
216. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 29.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. art. 46.
220. Id.
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the area it claims to ensure compliance with the Convention.2 2
This is, of course, a far cry from a state's right to decide on its
own how it chooses to regulate mining in its territory. Nevertheless, it does breach two important lines of principle: territorial
claimants are given special rights because they are territorial
claimants, and the claimant in a specific area is given special rights
with respect to the very area it claims.
Moreover, the membership accorded the United States and
the Soviet Union on all regulatory committees is explained not in
terms of their widespread activities in Antarctica, or their political
and strategic importance, but in terms of their status as states that
believe they have a basis for a claim in Antarctica.
With the Convention, the question is no longer whether territorial claimants will receive special accommodations, particularly
with respect to the areas they claim. The question now is, how
much? The very power of the claimants on the Regulatory Committees suggests that further special accommodations will be demanded if any Antarctic resources in areas claimed by at least certain states are to be developed. Because the concessions demanded
may have either economic impact on miners or juridical impact on
the position of states that do not recognize claims, it can be expected that potential miners might choose to encourage their sponsoring states to accommodate the juridical demands of the claimants so as to reduce the pressure for economic concessions from the
miners.
The difficulty with this system is that it whets the appetites of
nationalistic elements in the claimant states beyond what they
might have expected on the basis of earlier Antarctic arrangements. The claimants are now in a position to "salami-slice" the
position of the non-claimants on so many issues (and in such thin
slices) that it will be difficult for the non-claimants to resist further erosion. The fact that the territorial claimants are allies or
friends of the United States merely increases the temptation. Yet
the end result of each new "accommodation" may be an increase in
the expectations of the claimants.
Thus, each new "accommodation" brings us closer to the day
when nationalistic elements in one of the territorial claimant states
will be tempted to believe that the non-claimant position has been
221. Id. art. 29.
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so completely compromised that it is safe to attempt exercising at
least some aspects of territorial sovereignty in the claimed area.
The end result, as even the more moderate claimant states recognize, would be a collapse of the entire Antarctic system and a resultant scramble for position. Meaningful international environmental regulation could be the first casualty.
In order for the forces of moderation within the claimant
states to prevail, they need to be able to raise serious doubts (if
only privately) about both the legality and the practical enforceability of the claims. While some flexibility on the part of the nonclaimants is needed to reinforce the position of the moderates, at
some point further "accommodation" of the territorial claims will
begin to undermine the position of the moderates. The Convention
text itself may be that point.
The difficulty is that the very completion of the Convention
text, whether or not it is ratified, means that the genie is at least
partially out of the bottle. It is by no means clear that the most
effective way to deal with the problem is to reject the Convention,
in the belief that the genie will disappear. Rejection could precipitate a crisis regarding the territorial claims in a context in which
domestic and foreign public opinion would be unwilling to support
the measures necessary to protect the United States position. The
question is whether the United States could come to a domestic
understanding that would allow it to accept the Convention under
conditions that might deter the genie's further progress and even
reinforce the U.S. position. If the question is whether the United
States ratifies the Convention-particularly if the question is
whether the Senate gives its advice and consent and Congress enacts implementing legislation before debates about arcane provisions of a liability protocol ensue-then it might be possible to
reach domestic agreement on fairly firm language and measures to
protect the long-range integrity of the United States position.
Two steps can be considered. The first is a clear reaffirmation
of the United States juridical position in unmistakable terms in
any instrument of ratification to the effect that the United States
will not recognize any foreign territorial claims in Antarctica, that
it will not acquiesce in any attempt to apply or enforce those
claims, that it has a right to use all of Antarctica subject only to its
treaty obligations, that it has a basis of claim in Antarctica, and
that it has no intention of abandoning or prejudicing these positions. This should be done at a minimum.

1989]

ANTARCTIC MINERALS CONVENTION

However, this in and of itself says nothing to the claimants
about what the United States is and is not prepared to do, and
how the United States may react if it is pushed too far. To achieve
a clear message on these issues, while avoiding unnecessary provocation, the United States should consider several steps:
1) the instrument of ratification, or the implementing legislation, might clarify the points at which the United States will not
accept any attempt to impose the policies or give priority to the
interests of a territorial claimant with respect to the specific area it
claims;
2) the United States might make clear that any attempt to
apply the laws of a territorial claimant to a United States national
by virtue of activities in or affecting the claimed area will be resisted by the United States by all appropriate means;
3) the United States might include in its implementing legislation provisions that would take effect in the event that the United
States withdraws from the Convention. The legislation might permit prospecting anywhere in Antarctica, and permit the appropriate U.S. Government agency to grant American citizens rights to
conduct mineral exploration and development activities anywhere
in Antarctica that are exclusive as against U.S. nationals and the
nationals of reciprocating states (and perhaps others doing business in the United States either directly or through subsidiaries or
agents). Environmental and other standards similar to those set
forth in the Convention could also be included;
4) the United States might indicate to the claimants privately
that if pushed too far it might lose its incentive to oppose United
Nations involvement in Antarctica; and
5) the United States might coordinate its policy with other
non-claimants, including Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union,
and encourage them to take steps similar to those outlined above.
VII.

LIABILITY

The liability provisions of the Convention deal almost exclusively with environmental considerations. 2 All that the Convention says about liability for personal injury to or death of a human
being or injury to property not involving environmental or related
222. See id. art. 8.
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law and pro-

An operator (miner) is strictly liable for all environmental
damage, including, but not limited to, clean-up and restoration
costs.2 24 Thus, for example, the operator must pay if there is no
restoration to the status quo ante following damage to the environment. 25 How much must be paid, however, is not specified.
Who precisely is entitled to payment where there is no personal
injury or damage to private property is unclear, but one might assume that the funds would be collected and expended by the Commission. One also presumes that damage claims by territorial
claimants for environmental damage to the claimed areas as such
would not be permitted.
The operator has a limited number of defenses available. It is
not liable to the extent damage was caused directly by a natural
disaster of exceptional character which could not have been foreseen, 2 6 by armed conflict, 27 or by an act of terrorism against
which 228no reasonable precautionary measures could have been
taken.
The operator's right to seek contribution or indemnity from
another party which caused or contributed to the damage is unaffected,2 9 but this does not limit the operator's liability to a claimant. 23 0 Even a negligent plaintiff may collect damages from the operator; only if the operator proves that the plaintiff caused the
damage by an intentional or grossly negligent act is it relieved in
whole or in part of the duty to pay compensation.23 1 Pursuant to
this system, an operator might well be liable for environmental
damage if, for example, an iceberg or a ship crashes into the operator's offshore drilling rig.
In addition, to the extent the operator or some other source
does not satisfy all claims, the sponsoring state is liable for damage
caused by the operator that would not have occurred had the spon223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. art. 8(5).
Id. art. 8(2).
Id. art. 8(2)(a).
Id. art. 8(4)(a).
Id. art. 8(4)(b).
Id.
Id. art. 8(11)(b).
See id. art. 8(10).
Id. art. 8(6).
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soring state adequately supervised the operator as required by the
Convention.2 32 Thus, for example, the United States could be liable
for claims that are not satisfied by the operator it sponsors or insurance funds.
The result is a very risk-adverse liability regime. Such a regime may be appropriate in light of the underlying environmental
values. The difficulty is that mining companies, sponsoring states,
and insurance companies are likely to be reluctant to accept such
potential liability if it is open-ended. Thus, the economic acceptability of these provisions depends on the protocol that remains to
be negotiated and particularly on the liability limits fixed in the
protocol and associated fund arrangements. 3 3 The Convention also
leaves open the possibility of establishing an international claims
23
tribunal in the protocol. '
Permits for exploration and development may not be issued
23 5
until the liability protocol enters into force for the applicant.
Prospecting, on the other hand, may go forward. Pending the entry
into force of the protocol, claims against prospectors may be
brought in national courts pursuant to the provisions of the Convention and national law implementing those provisions. 3 6
Given the importance and complexity of the negotiations regarding the liability protocol, it might be useful for the United
States to try to establish a model by enacting a domestic liability
regime for prospecting prior to the protocol's entry into force, as
contemplated by the Convention. In that case Congress, in addition to the Executive, would be the arbiter of the competing interests asserted by domestic industry and environmental groups on
the question of liability limits and other matters. Because a domestic statute would reflect Congress' judgment on certain underlying
issues, but would apply only pending entry into force of the protocol, it might strengthen the United States position in negotiation
of the protocol without unduly tying its delegation's hands.
The difficulty is that a domestic statute is only needed to the
extent it is contemplated that the United States may become a
party to the Convention prior to the negotiation of the protocol.
Thus one must consider whether a more obvious strategy of with232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

8(3)(a).
8(7).
8(7)(c)(ii).
8(9).
8(10).
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holding congressional action on the Convention and implementing
legislation until a protocol is completed would in fact strengthen
the capacity of the United States, including the Congress, to influence the negotiation of a protocol more than a domestic liability
statute enacted as part of the implementing legislation and ratification process prior to completion of the protocol.

VIII.

CONCLUSION: QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

It is wise to keep four general questions in mind when evaluating the Antarctic Minerals Convention. To what extent is the Convention likely to achieve its underlying objective of promoting stability or, conversely, to create conflicts over territorial claims and
other issues that may threaten the long-term stability of the
Antarctic Treaty system? What is the net effect of the Convention
on the totality of United States interests in Antarctica, including,
but not limited to, its economic, environmental, and scientific interests as well as its interests in stability? What can the United
States do to maximize the accommodation of its interests under
the Convention? What are the net costs and benefits to the United
States of alternatives to ratification of the Convention?
While complete answers to any of these questions at the present time may not be possible, it is to be hoped that the analysis of
the issues addressed this article may prove helpful in arriving at
any final assessment.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
Membership in Convention Organs
1. Commission

Which Convention Parties?'

Who Decides?

Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties as of 25 Nov. 1988'

Fixed by text

State actively engaged in
substantial scientific, technical
or environmental research in
Antarctic area that is directly
relevant to decisions about
Antarctic mineral exploration
and exploitation, particularly
environmental decisions'

Commission:
-if candidate is Treaty a

State sponsoring on-going
exploration or development
(mining)e

Same as above

Consultative Party,' 1/3 + 1 can

block;
-otherwise, any Commission
member can block;4

1. Only states party to the Antarctic Treaty may become parties to the Convention.
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for signature, Nov. 25, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859, art. 61 [hereinafter Convention]. Pursuant to Article XIII
of the Antarctic Treaty, all U.N. members may become parties to the Antarctic Treaty, as
well as any other state invited to accede by all the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic
Treaty. Antarctic Treaty, art. XIII, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71.
2. Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United
States, and Uruguay. See generally Convention, art. 18(2)(a).
3. See supra note I for a list the existing Consultative Parties. Any other state party to
the Antarctic Treaty may become a Consultative Party during such time as it conducts
substantial scientific research activity in Antarctica, such as the establishment of a scientific
station or the despatch of a scientific expedition. See Antarctic Treaty, art. IX.
4. Convention, art. 18(2)(b).
5. Id. art. 18(4).
6. Id. art. 18(2)(c).
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Regulatory Committee (for Specific Area)

Which Commission Members?
7

Who Decides?

4 territorial claimants,
including any claimants
specifice areas

Unless overruled by
Commission, its in that
Chairman's recommendation
prevails9 but any claimant in
that specific area has right to
serve and in effect to name the
other claimant members;

6 non-claimants, including the
2 that assert a basis of claim
in Antarctica"0

Text fixes 2 members. Unless
overruled by its Commission,
its Chairman's recommendation
prevails on the remaining 4
members. 1

Above membership of 10 must include:
(1) members of Commission that contributed substantial scientific, technical or environmental information relevant to identification of that specific area; and 2
(2) at least 3 developing countries."

7. Seven states have made claims over part of Antarctica: Argentina, Australia, Chile,
France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.
8. Convention art. 29(2)(a), (2)(c)(i), (3), (4)(a), (5). A textual cross-reference to developing countries in effect requires that nomination of Argentina or Chile at least be
considered.
9. Id. art. 29(5). A three-fourths vote of the Commission would be required to overrule
the Chairman's recommendation, unless three-fourths of the Commission were prepared to
regard the matter as a procedural question requiring only a majority vote. Id. art. 22 (1), (3).
10. The United States and Soviet Union are the two states that assert a basis of claim
in Antarctica. Id. art. 29(2)(b), (2)(c)(ii), (3), (4)(b), 5.
11. See supra note 8.
12. Convention, art. 29(3)(a). In the event that a state sponsoring prospecting, exploration or development (mining) in the specific area concerned is not one of the 10 members of
the Regulatory Committee, it has the right to be added as a member for specific periods and
purposes. The sponsor of prospecting serves only until it applies for an exploration permit.
The sponsor of exploration or development (mining) participates in decisions affecting only
the activities it sponsors, and need not be a Commission member. Id. art. 29(6).
13. Id. art. 29(3)(b). The Final Act refers to the possibility of subsequently amending
the Convention to increase the number of developing country members of the Regulatory
Committees if their relative representation on the Commission increases. Such an amendment would require a two-thirds majority, including the affirmative votes of all Commission
members. Amendments are prohibited for the first tO years. Id. art. 64.
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3.

Advisory Committee

Which Convention Parties?

Who Decides?

All 14

Fixed in text

4. Special Meeting of States Parties
Which Convention Parties?

Who Decides?

All1 5

Fixed in text

14. Id. art. 23(2). The representative should have suitable scientific, technical or environmental competence. Id. art. 23(3).
15. Id. art. 28(2).
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TABLE II
Selected Functions of Convention Organs
1. Scientific Research
Scientific research is excluded from the definition of mineral
resource activities and thus from regulation under the
Convention.'
2. Areas Closed to Mineral Resource Activities (or Restricted)

3.

Which areas?

Who decides? How?

Area designated under
Antartic Treaty as Specially
Protected Area, Site of
Special Scientific Interest, or
protected area.2

Who: Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties
How: approval by all
Consultative Party
governments 3

Area designated under
Convention as protected
6
area.

Who: Commission4
How: 3/4 majority'

All Mineral Resource Activities (Prospecting, Exploration
and Development)

What?

Who decides? How?

General environmental
7
protection measures

Who: Commission

Notification and application
fees9

Who: Commission
How: Consensus 0

How: 3 majority'

1. Convention, supra table I, note 1. art. 1(7). See Antarctic Treaty, supra table I, note
1, arts. II, III, VI, VIII(1), IX(I) regarding scientific research.
2. Unless designation provides otherwise. Convention, art. 13(1).
3. Antarctic Treaty, art. IX.
4. With advice of Advisory Committee. Convention, art. 26(2)(a).
5. Id. art. 22(1).
6. Id arts. 13(2), 21(1)(b).
7. Id. art. 21(1)(c).
8. Id. art. 22(1).
9. Id. arts. 21(l)(p), 37, 39, 44, 53.
10. Id. art. 22(2). Consensus is defined as the absence of formal objection. Id. art. 22(5).
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Measures on availability and
confidentiality of data and
information

Who: Commission
How: /4 majorityl"

4. Prospecting

5.

What?

Who decides? How?

[Permission to prospect]

[Not required]

Variation from 25-meter 3
maximum drilling depth;'
time limit beyond 10 yars for
release of basic data"5

Who: Commission
How: 3/ majority'

2

Request of a State Party to Identify (Open) an Area for
Possible Exploration and Development
What?

Who decides? How?

Advice to Commission on
scientific, technical and
enviornmental aspects,
including all views
expressed'

Who: Advisory Committee
How: Pursuant to its Rules
of Procedure"e

Report to Commission on
consistency with the
Convention, including all
views expressed 8

Who: Special Meeting of
States Parties
How: Pursuant to its Rules
of Procedure'"

11. Id. art. 22(1).
12. Id. art. 37(2).
13. Id arts. 1(8), 21(1)(e)(1).
14. Id. art. 22(1).
15. Id. arts. 16(a), 21(1)(h), 37(13).
16. Adoption of the Advisory Committee's rules of procedure requires a three-fourths
majority of the Advisory Committee and approval in the Commission. Id. art. 25(4). Commission approval probably requires a three-fourths majority. Id. art. 22(1).
17. Id. arts. 26(2)(a), 27, 40(1).
18. Id. arts. 28, 40(2)-(4).
19. Adoption of the Special Meeting's rules of procedure requires a three-fourths majority of the participants. Until this is done, provisional rules adopted by the Commission
apply. Id. art. 28(5). Commission adoption of provisional rules probably requires a threefourths majority. Id. art. 22(1).
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Decision to identify (open)

Who: Commission

an area, including resources
covered, elaboration of
opportunities for
participation by developing
countries and others, general
guidelines regarding
operational requirements,
block size, advice concerning
support activities, and
dispute settlement
procedures"'

How: Consensus

Establishment of Regulatory
Committee for area identified

Who: Commission
How: See Table I

0

Exploration and Development (Mining)
What?

Who decides? How?

Advice to Regulatory
Committee on scientific,
technical and environmental
aspects of various decisions,
including all views
2

Who: Advisory Committee
How: Pursuant to its Rules
of Procedure2 2

Block sizes,24 application
fees, 5 application
procedures, means for
selecting among competing
applicants2 7

Who: Regulatory Committee
How: 2/3 majority"

expressed

3

20. Id. arts. 22(2), 41(2). If the Commission Chairman determines that there will be an
objection, he consults Commission members and, if the objection will persist, convenes
members most directly interested for the purpose of producing a generally acceptable proposal. Id. art. 22(5).
21. Id. arts. 21(1)(d), 41, 42, 59.
22. See supra note 1, table I.
23. Convention, arts. 26, 27, 43(6), 51(2), 52, 54(6).
24. Subject to any measure adopted by the Commission in this regard.
25. Id.
26. Convention, art. 32(3).
27. Id. art. 43(2). Competing applicants for the same block are first given a prescribed
time by the Regulatory Committee to resolve the matter amongst themselves by means of
their own choice. Id. art. 45(4).
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Guidelines identifying the
general requirements for
exploration and
development"

Who: Regulatory Committee
How: 2/3 majority, including
half the claimant members2 9
and half of the non-claimant
members"0

Levies on miners to cover
costs of Convention
32
institutions

Who: Commission
How: Consensus"

What?

Who decides? How?

Permit to explore and
approval management
scheme for exploration and
development (mining),
including duration, safety
and environmental
protection, liability,
payments (taxes or royalties),
data and reporting,
confidentiality, and dispute
settlement"

Who: Regulatory
Committee"
How: 2/3 majority, including
majority of claimants34 and
majority of non-claimants"6

Modification of the
management scheme as
condition of issuing
development (mining) and
permit s

Who: Regulatory
Committee"
How: 2/3 majority, including
majority of claimants 5 and
non-claimants 40

28. Id. art. 43(3), 43(5).
29. Normally 2 of the 4 non-claimants.
30. Normally 3 of the 6 non-claimants. Convention, art. 32(2).
31. Id. art. 21(2).
32. Id. art. 21(1)(q).
33. Article 46 requires the Regulatory Committee, in considering applications for exploration permits, managements schemes and development permits, to have recourse to the
sponsoring state, any state or states making claims in the area over which the Regulatory
Committee has competence, and, as may be required, I or 2 additional members of the
Regulatory Committee. Id. art. 46.
34. Normally 3 of the 4 claimants.
35. Normally 4 of the 6 non-claimants. Convention, art. 32(1).
36. Id. arts. 44-48.
37. See supra note 18.
38. Normally 3 of the 4 claimants.
39. Id. art. 54(3)-(5).
40. Normally 4 of the 6 non-claimants. Convention, art. 32(1).
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Issuance of development
(mining) permit"'

Who: Regulatory
Committee"2

Request that Regulatory
Committee reconsider its
decision to approve the
management scheme or issue
development permit"

Who: Commission

What?

Who decides? How?

General rules regarding
suspension, modification, or
cancellation of a
management scheme,
penalties, and compensation
to miner"'

Who: Commission

Suspension, modification, or
cancellation of a
management scheme,
penalties, and compensation
to miner s

How: Regulatory Committee
How: 2/ majority"

How: 3 majority"5

How: 3 majority"

7. Budget and Expenditures
What?

Who decides? How?

Budget, financial regulations,
financial obligations of
States"0 Disposition of
surplus revenues, if any"'

Who:
How:
Who:
How:

Commission
Consensus"9
Commission2
5
Consensus

41. Id. art. 54(5).
42. Article 42(5) provides that the Regulatory Committee shall issue a development
permit without delay if it approves modifications to the management scheme or if it does
not consider that such modifications are necessary. The question of when the Committee's
duty to issue the development permit arises, and how it is fulfilled, is addressed in the main
text of the article. Id. art. 42(5).
43. Id. art. 22(1).
44. Id. arts. 21(1)(1), 49.
45. Id. art. 21(1).
46. Id. art. 51(6).
47, Id. art. 32(3).
48. Id. art. 51.
49. Id. art. 22(2).
50. Id. arts. 21(1)(o), 35.
51. Id. art. 21(l)(r).
52. Id. art. 22(2).
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TABLE III
Blocking Power on a Regulatory Committee
Votes Requiring a 2/3 Majority

Present and Voting

Absent or Abstention

Negative Votes
to Block

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
1

Additional Blocking Options Where 2/3 Vote Must Include Half
the Claimants and Half the Non-Claimants

Claimants
Present and Voting

Claimants
Absent or Abstention

Claimants
Negative Votes
to Block

4
3
2
1

0
1
2
3

3
2
2
1

Non-Claimants
Present and Voting

Non-Claimants
Absent or Abstention

Non-Claimants
Negative Votes
to Block

5
3
2
1

1
3
4
5

3
2
2
1
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Additional Blocking Options Where 2/3 Vote Must Include
Majority of Claimants and Majority of Non-Claimants
Claimants
Present and Voting

Claimants

Claimants

Absent or Abstention

Negative Votes
to Block

4
3
2
1

0
1
2
3

2
2

Non-Claimants
Present and Voting

Non-Claimants
Absent or Abstention

Non-Claimants
Negative Votes
to Block

6
5
4
3
2

0
1
2
3
4
5

3
3
2
2

1
1

1
I

